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Minor shifts in emphasis between the process and entitative dimensions of management 
constructs can be an effective method for theory generation.  However, such shifts require 
corresponding adjustments in both ontology and epistemology.  Where ontology and 
epistemology drift out of alignment, there is significant potential for confusion.  Four kinds of 
epistemic-ontological movement are described and illustrated using a range of examples, 
particularly from the communities of practice literature, and implications discussed for both 
theory and practice. 
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Management scholars differ about the most effective way to develop theory within 
organizational studies.  Perhaps the most obvious debate has been at the level of ontology, 
between those adopting a structural realist logic relating to an approximate correspondence 
between knowledge and observable reality, and those who highlight the socially constructed, 
dynamic and partial nature of knowledge (Hassard, 1993).  Both perspectives would appear to 
be in good health in organization studies: use of structural equation modelling in organizational 
research, for example, has recently increased (MacCallum & Austin 2000), whilst qualitative 
research is now more widely used (Lowe and Gardner 2000) and is no longer questioned by 
most management scholars (Burgelman 2009).   
 
Scholars subscribing to a more structuralist worldview tend to emphasise the value of 
enduring models of reality that can be applied across multiple situations.  Those subscribing to a 
more socially constructivist viewpoint tend to emphasise the limitations of such models in 
engaging accurately with unfolding, often socially inflected, complexity on the ground.  As the 
above exchange in AMR illustrates, positions in this ‘paradigm war’ can become entrenched.  In 
response, many organization researchers have developed epistemologies that are realist, 
objectivist, and evolutionary, but which also acknowledge the crucial role played by 
intersubjective, emergent, and metaphysical factors in shaping organizational reality 
(McKelvey, 2003).  Such constructs are described as ‘mid-range’ theory (Merton, 1949; Weick, 
1989).  Mid-range theory acknowledges the importance of abstraction, representation and 
refinement of general principles that apply across multiple situations, whilst also recognising the 
limitations of such entitative abstractions in accurately representing emergent, contingent and 
locally specific reality.  Examples of mid-range theory used within organization studies include 
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institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), information theory (Weick, 1969), information 
diffusion theory (Rogers 1962), role theory (Sarbin 1966), and situated learning theory (Lave & 
Wenger 1991). 
 
However, the term ‘mid-range theory’ masks a range of differences in emphases: some 
constructs highlight the entitative aspects of a phenomenon, whilst others highlight its more 
situated, contingent and emergent aspects.  Even minor shifts in emphasis in a construct can be 
helpful in identifying different aspects of a phenomenon, and combining and comparing these 
different perspectives is often valuable for generating new theory.  A clear example is recent 
developments in our understanding of organizational knowledge, now understood by many as 
“embrained, embodied, encultured, [and] embedded” – and hence immanent within inter-
subjective processes – but also “encoded”, and reflecting a more explicit organizational reality 
(Blackler 1995).   
 
These concepts lie in various positions across the spectrum between the traditionally more 
polarised ‘process’ and ‘entitative’ conceptions of organizational knowledge, and their differing 
positions along the spectrum have enabled a more multifaceted understanding of the 
phenomenon under study.  Similar multifaceted approaches to organizational knowledge that 
combine elements of entitative and process thinking include conceptions of knowledge as “the 
residue of thinking” (McDermott 1999:105), a phenomenological emphasis on the process of 
“knowing” (Blackler 1995) and a conception of the organization itself as a distributed 
knowledge system (Tsoukas 1996).  In turn, these enhanced perspectives have fed through to the 
practitioner literature (e.g. Von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000; Davenport & Prusak 2000).   
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This paper seeks to build a deeper understanding of how scholars can consciously use 
relatively minor alterations in ontological emphasis such as those described above to enable a 
creative process of generating mid-range theory.  However, it also focuses on the importance of 
supporting such shifts in ontological emphasis with a consistent shift in epistemological 
framework.  In other words, it demonstrates the negative effect on construct clarity that can 
occur where epistemology and ontology ‘drift’ out of alignment with one another such that 
entities are discussed as if they were processes, and processes are discussed as if they were 
entities. 
 
For example, when discussing the more explicit, encoded aspects of organizational 
knowledge, a representational epistemology should be used that is consistent with a discussion 
of stable entities at the ontological level.  Here, concepts such as documented routines, 
information, data, knowledge capture, and codification are appropriate; using concepts such as 
‘practice’, ‘identity’, and ‘power’, borrowed from more process-oriented thinking, would make 
for an unclear discussion.  Similarly, approaching the more tacit, embrained/embodied aspects 
of knowledge, such has been identified as important in generating social capital (Adler & Kwon, 
2002), requires engaging with something more subjective that emerges through activity and over 
time.  Here, an epistemology is required that is capable of engaging with aspects of dynamic 
process at the ontological level, such as ‘practice’, ‘identity’, and power’ – and discussion of  
documented routines, information, data, knowledge capture, and codification is confusing in this 
context – although there is ample evidence that this happens (e.g. Pugh & Dixon 2008). 
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The argument is organized into three parts.  The first part describes in greater detail how 
process worldviews differ from their historically more mainstream entitative counterparts.  It 
outlines the great importance of maintaining epistemological and ontological alignment during 
the alterations in emphasis from one to the other that take place within mid-range theory.  
Changes in ontological emphasis that maintain epistemic-ontological alignment are termed 
‘ontological shift’, and are considered to maintain the integrity of a construct; those changes 
where such alignment is not maintained, and the construct is considered to have been 
compromised, are termed ‘ontological drift’.  The second part illustrates the significance of the 
argument through a detailed empirical example of the evolution over time of the ‘community of 
practice’ construct (Lave & Wenger 1991), in which examples of both ontological shift and drift 
are visible.  The community of practice literature is a valuable case study in this regard, since it 
exemplifies mid-range theory in which constructs have undergone successive changes in 
emphasis, in this case from an initially process-oriented towards a progressively more entitative 
worldview.  The third part provides a discussion of the implications of the concepts of 
ontological shift and drift for organizational theory-building and practice. 
 
BACKGROUND TO KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Process and Entity 
 
The relationship between the notion of a thing, or ‘entity’ (stable, solid, bounded, 
controllable) and a process (unstable, fluid, emergent, elusive) is one of the oldest philosophical 
debates known to humankind, in which the “ruling tradition” is "the Platonic and Aristotelian 
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belief that fixity is a nobler and worthier thing than change" (James 1909, in Tsoukas & Chia 
2002: 569).  In a clear and illuminating essay, Chia (1997), a leading exponent of process-
oriented management studies, traces the roots of this ruling tradition in the Greeks’ ontological 
commitment to the unitary, permanent and unchangeable reality of Parmenides, in which entities 
are primary to process: it is things that change. 
 
Within the field of management, mid-range theory has been developed by scholars 
adopting primarily entitative, as well as scholars adopting primarily process-oriented, 
worldviews.  More entitative approaches to theorising about organizations are exemplified by 
the Aston group (e.g. Pugh, Hickson & Hinings, 1986), which sought to build mid-range theory 
around the principle of classification of similarities and differences between organizations.  As 
Chia (1997) points out, the resulting systems view, in which organizations are viewed as distinct 
entities, has been influential within mainstream organizational thought, and forms the dominant 
approach within a range of organizational studies, including textbooks (e.g. Wilson & 
Rosenfeld, 1990; Donaldson, 1996). 
 
In contrast, the process viewpoint takes the view that apparently stable entities are in fact 
more accurately viewed as unfolding processes (‘you never step in the same river twice’).  
Because this may be less familiar, a short explanation of this viewpoint is offered below.  
Process-oriented theorists argue that if we build theory about what happens to things, it becomes 
difficult to appreciate processes in which the ‘thing’ and the ‘happening’ are collapsed into a 
single becoming (e.g. Tsoukas 1996, Feldman 2000, Chia 2002, Sturdy 2003, Carlsen 2006).  
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An associated literature has also developed concerned with the co-constitution of human agency 
and social factors in unfolding ‘practices’ (for a review, see Schatzki 2001).   
 
A useful introduction to the value of process thinking for management scholars who may 
be unfamiliar with its full implications is Bakken and Hernes’ (2006) paper entitled ‘organizing 
is both a verb and a noun’, which proposes that researchers should be cutting verbs and nouns 
from the same cloth (2006: 1602).  In illustrating the co-constitution of verbs and nouns, Bakken 
and Hernes draw on Von Foerster’s example of the ‘pseudopod’ whereby amoebas or similar 
unicellular organisms extend temporary projections to propel themselves or engulf food, shown 
in Figure 1 below: 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The above illustration shows various ‘snapshots’ of the organism in its fluid movement 
from position/form 1, to position/form 6. Although we can see six isolable, spatially separate 
positions during its trajectory – to which we might attach labelling nouns, the pseudopod is 
always moving.  Any representative snapshot taken of the pseudopod at, say position 2 would be 
an inaccurate representation of the organism, since it bears no relationship to its shape moments 
later at, say, position 4: the labels are inadequate for describing something that works as a 
process, since they exist only for a moment.  Taking more snapshots in ever finer gradations of 
atomistic reductionism between these positions would never entirely describe the pseudopod 
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either; there would always be fragments of movement that would elude capture by these 
snapshots.  In this example, scholars of organizational process would argue that a noun-based 
epistemology is profoundly inadequate for engaging with the ontological status of the 
pseudopod, since it is unable to capture its essence.  In contrast, they would claim that the 
‘essence’ of the pseudopod lies in its fluidity - for which it is necessary to combine a physical 
dimension (noun) with a temporal dimension (verb).  The pseudopod exists, and should be 
discussed, within both dimensions.   
 
Scholars adopting a strongly process-oriented worldview highlight the shortcomings of the 
snapshots abstracted from the unfolding process in Figure 1.  However, in communicating a 
sense of the contextually contingent fluidity with which the pseudopod moves, such entitative 
abstractions remain useful indicators of the manner of the pseudopod’s movement, and thus of 
its nature.  In this sense, and returning to the relationship between process and entity, the 
pseudopod example demonstrates the usefulness of both perspectives in studying different 
aspects of a phenomenon.  By the same token, in organizational studies, we continue to use 
organograms as convenient, useful representations of organizational structure within mid-range 
organizational theory, although experience tells us that these entitative snapshots tell us little 
about what is actually going on, and that these are quickly out of date.   
 
The important point made here is that both entitative and process-oriented perspectives 
bring valuable attributes to our understanding of the world.  Shifting between more process-
oriented and more entitative perspectives on a phenomenon can generate new theoretical 
insights providing their respective strengths and limitations are understood.  As pointed out by 
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Van Maanen, Sorensen, and Mitchell (2007), theorizing always entails trade-offs between 
simplicity and complexity, originality and semblance, and specificity and generality.  When 
undertaking shifts in ontological emphasis to highlight another dimension of a phenomenon, we 
are necessarily making a new trade-off between entitative and process perspectives in which one 
is necessarily emphasised at the expense of the other.  Of central importance in this paper is 
what happens when such shifts take place.  The next section seeks to build a detailed 
understanding of what is involved when such trade-offs occur, and explains how these can be 
achieved positively, as well as what can happen when entitative and process perspectives 
become misaligned, and we attribute process-like qualities to entities, and vice versa.   
 
Ontological shift or Ontological drift: Abstraction, Conjunction, Reification and 
Processification 
 
Figure 2 sets out a number of important characteristics that mark the differences between a 
process-oriented and an entitative worldview.  More specifically it highlights the characteristics 
of their respective epistemologies and (top half) and ontologies (bottom half).  As has been 
demonstrated using the examples of organizational knowledge and the pseudopod, a process 
ontology that sees the world as comprising entity and movement (quadrant 2) requires a more 
holistic, contingent epistemology capable of engaging with such a worldview (quadrant 1).  
Figure 2 also illustrates that an entitative ontology that sees the world as made up of more 
stable, independent structures requires a corresponding ‘snapshot epistemology’ for which more 
objective representations are appropriate.  For example, if we are describing an ontologically 
stable entity such as an office block or an explicit, codified piece of information (quadrant 4), 
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the epistemological framework in quadrant 3 is more suited.  In this way, the pairings of 
quadrants 1&2 and 3&4 show epistemic-ontological alignment. 
 
Further, Figure 2 posits that four different types of epistemic-ontological movement are 
possible as constructs develop and evolve.  The first movement is abstraction – left to right in 
Figure 2 (quadrants 1&2 to 3&4), in which, like the pseudopod, a representation is literally 
‘abstracted’ from an ongoing process, in order to give form to the flux of organizational 
experience.  Examples of such a movement include the generation of ‘best practice’ artefacts 
from emergent, sociomaterially embedded organizational practice, such as unified modelling in 
organizational workflow design (Rashid, Masood, & Weston, 2009), the definition and adoption 
of common standards to enable supply chain integration (Xu, 2007), and the central role of 
endorsed standard practices within professions (Mahony 2003).  In these examples, the 
limitations of the abstraction process are acknowledged, within a conscious ‘ontological shift’ in 
which the intent is to simplify the complexity of organizational process into an isolable entity, 
whose simplified properties can then be used to advantage. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The second movement, here termed ‘conjunction’, is in the reverse direction, right to left in 
Figure 2 (quadrants 3&4 to 1&2), and this reversal is reflected in its name, whose Latin root is 
the literal inverse of abstraction.  Conjunction involves an equally conscious shift from a purely 
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entitative worldview to one that seeks knowingly to explore the more processual, conjoined 
dimensions of a construct.  A good example of conjunction is Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) 
‘knowledge spiral’, which sought to challenge many organizations’ assumptions that their 
knowledge was located primarily in entitative, explicit forms by exploring the tacit processes 
through which such mainstream knowledge assets are created and refined.  When discussing the 
tacit components of their knowledge spiral – socialisation and internalisation - Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) are careful to emphasise that organizations require a very different way of 
conceptualising and treating such tacit components from the ways in which they treat the more 
explicit, isolable activities of externalising and combining knowledge.  Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
‘knowledge spiral’ is in fact an example of a mid-range theory based on a knowing ontological 
shift back and forth between abstraction and conjunction. 
 
A further, more recent example of ontological shift involving conjunction is the ‘strategy as 
practice’ movement (e.g. Whittington 2003; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) which seeks a view of 
strategy as ‘what people do’ (quadrant 2) rather than as an entity such as a strategy document, or 
roadmap (quadrant 4).  In highlighting “the complexity of processes that give rise to a strategy 
and the political influence of many organizational members in doing so, not only through formal 
organizational processes but also in their everyday activities” (Johnson, Langley, Melin, & 
Whittington, 2007: 6), strategy as practice researchers stress the way that entitative conceptions 
of strategy can be enhanced through a lens that highlights its enacted, and thus necessarily 
conjoined, dimensions. The epistemological shift is subtle, however; such a view continues to 
acknowledge the importance of artefacts such as formal processes and documents in 
crystallising strategic direction, and thus does not attempt inappropriately to supplant an 
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entitative with a process worldview.  Strategy as practice appears to be a further good example 
of the potentially rich potential for theory generation that can be achieved by reframing a 
previously entitative construct via a conjunctive shift in ontological emphasis. 
 
In addition to the two kinds of ontological shift, Figure 2 shows that two kinds of 
‘ontological drift’ are also possible, in which epistemology and ontology become misaligned 
with a correspondingly negative effect on the clarity of the construct.  One of these, reification, 
forms the third possible movement in Figure 2, and is a commonly acknowledged fallacy 
(Lefevbre, 2004, Whitehead, 1925), deriving from the Latin words for ‘thing’, res, and ‘to 
transform’, facere (Douglas, 1986).  Reification describes the attribution of entitative existence 
to processes (quadrants 3&4 to 3&2) – or transforming a social construct (such as an institution) 
into a thing with unquestioned, separable ontological existence, and ‘phantom objectivity’ 
(Lukács, 1969).  Such a fallacy is described as a form of ‘ontological drift’, as the ontological 
claims have ‘drifted’ out of alignment with the appropriate epistemological lens.  Various 
strands of institutional theory (e.g. Hall & Taylor, 1996) are indeed definable as conscious 
attempts to avoid attributing standalone ontological existence to institutions and thus 
unintentionally reifying them, by being careful to acknowledge their embeddedness in ongoing 
socio-political-cultural processes. 
 
Avoiding reification is not always easy, however; continuing with institutional theory, for 
example, there is evidence (Kim 2005) that some theorists have tried to apply an overly static, 
entitative epistemology (quadrant 3) to understand institutional continuity over time, resulting in 
epistemic-ontological misalignment and loss of construct clarity.  In such cases, an entitative 
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focus on constraining structures may appear at first sight more appropriate for explaining 
continuity - but is actually inappropriate for explaining continuity conceived as emergent 
process (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990).  In contrast, Kim (2005) advocates an 
approach that views institutional embeddedness over time as a process of constant change 
(quadrant 1) – a ‘correct’ alignment of epistemology and ontology, that is also theoretically 
generative. 
 
A further example of ontological reification is the apparent transformation undergone by 
the concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ amongst a sizeable management audience.  Anyone seeking 
confirmation as to the organizational impact of this debate and conducting a quick internet 
search on the phrase “knowledge harvesting” will find that this concept has spawned a large 
industry in itself, and had a major impact on the direction of many organizations’ knowledge 
and training programs: a particularly marked example of this is the National Health Service in 
the UK, whose online dictionary explains that “Knowledge harvesting is an approach that allows 
the tacit knowledge or know-how of experts and top performers in an organization to be 
captured and documented.” (NHS 2005).  In such cases, ‘tacit knowledge’ has come over time 
to represent for many people an entirely different phenomenon at the level of experienced 
reality, transforming, in this case, from a description of an embodied, lived experience that 
emerges in practice, to a description of a disembodied entity that can be transferred and stored at 
will, with associated techniques and methodologies.  The implications of such a shift for the way 
in which organizations should seek to support their knowledge workers are profound. 
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The fourth kind of possible movement in Figure 2, termed here ‘processification’, is the 
opposite of reification, and is the second kind of ontological drift.  Reflecting the derivation of 
its counterpart reification, processification also derives from its Latin root, in this case the words 
for ‘process’, processus, and ‘to transform’, facere.  Processification remains less explored, but 
like reification is also a fallacy, and describes the attribution of process-like qualities to entities 
(quadrants 1&2 to 1&4).  This fallacy is potentially more dangerous to practitioners and 
researchers alike, since in representing things using process terms, organizations may be 
tempted to believe that their initiatives are more embedded or conjoined with supporting 
sociocultural processes than they actually are. 
 
An example of the danger of processification is the controversy surrounding the 
methodology of participative evaluation within development organizations (Cooke & Kothari 
2001).  Cooke and Kothari chart the rise to mainstream during the 1990s of ‘participative’ 
methodologies that sought to turn previously ‘top down’ decisions about peoples’ futures into 
‘bottom up’, open-ended processes of consultation capable of better engaging with emergent 
complexity on the ground.  In time, the very success of such approaches ensured that these 
became progressively hardened into standard ‘best practice’, with the result that at times 
‘participation’ became little more than a required name-check in securing funding.  The 
significance of this controversy lies in the important political connotations involved where 
something that has undergone ‘ontological hardening’ into an entity continues to be represented 
at epistemological level as a process: in Cooke and Kothari’s terms, decisions affecting 
communities are often framed using participative language as if these formed part of an open-
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ended process, when in reality participative activities are translated into pre-authorised 
categories and targets (ibid., 2001: 27). 
 
Summarising thus far, this paper highlights the way in which the development and 
evolution of mid-range theoretical constructs over time necessarily involves subtle alterations in 
emphasis along the process-entity spectrum, that demand close attention to ensuring a continued 
alignment between epistemology and ontology.  A distinction is made between four possible 
types of such alteration: abstraction, conjunction, reification and processification.  Abstraction 
and conjunction constitute instances of often richly theoretically generative ‘ontological shift’ 
where such alignment is maintained.  Reification and processification constitute a more 
problematic ‘ontological drift’, where epistemology and ontology become ‘unmoored’ one from 
the other, resulting in loss of construct clarity.  The next section provides an empirical example 
of all four instances of ontological shift/drift over time within the literature associated with 
communities of practice, or ‘CoPs’ (Lave & Wenger 1991) – a construct that has had a major 
impact on scholars and organizations alike.   
 
ONTOLOGICAL SHIFT AND DRIFT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF 
PRACTICE CANON 
 
Stemming from an original, ‘ancestor’ construct, cognition in practice (Lave 1988), the 
family of CoP-related constructs includes communities of practice (Lave & Wenger 1991, 
Wenger 1998), constellations of practice (Wenger 1998), networks of practice (Brown & 
Duguid 2000), collectivities of practice (Lindkvist 2005), inter-organizational communities of 
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practice (Moingeon, Quelin, Dalsace, & Lumineau, 2006), and virtual communities of practice 
(Dube, Bourhis, & Jacob, 2006).  These apparently similar-sounding constructs are particularly 
useful for illustrating how the change in perspective described in this article can be both richly 
generative where an ‘ontological shift’ is made explicit, as well as confusing in those cases 
where ‘ontological drift’ appears to have occurred between the nature of claims about the world 
and the conceptual lens through which these are discussed. 
 
Methodology: Construct Clarity and Genealogy 
 
In order to separate these, superficially similar, constructs from one another, Suddaby’s 
(2010, this journal) definition of construct clarity is applied to each construct to identify in each 
case whether ontological shift or drift has occurred, and to demonstrate any resulting effect this 
may have had – positive or negative - on theory generation.  Suddaby proposes that clear 
constructs should be first, precisely defined; second, used in a clearly explained and appropriate 
context; third, draw strength from their location within relevant semantic relationships; and 
fourth, cohere together in a logically consistent manner.  Suddaby’s definition is useful for the 
present purpose, since it invites explicit consideration of the level of epistemic-ontological 
alignment within a construct.  Beginning with ontology, a precise definition of a construct 
allows the reader to determine whether the claim being made about reality at the ontological 
level concerns an entity, or a process, or both.  Furthermore, the empirical context within which 
the phenomenon appears to be located provides further corroboration of the ontological status of 
the phenomenon under discussion: for example, whilst tacit knowledge is unlikely to be found in 
library books, (the context is at odds with the definition), we know we are more likely to be on 
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the right track if our empirical context lies in observed practice such as managers’ application of 
judgment. 
 
Similarly, analysis of the semantic relationships between a construct and those associated 
constructs from which it draws theoretical strength is a clear indicator of whether its 
epistemology is aligned with its ontological claims.  For example, Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of 
‘habitus’ is likely to offer a more consistent epistemological framework for a discussion of tacit 
knowledge than cognitive information processing theory (Reiser & Dempsey, 2007).  Finally, 
Suddaby proposes that “the construct, its definition, its scope conditions, its lineage, and its 
relationship to other constructs must all make sense” (2010: 351) – in other words, he 
invites consideration of the coherence of the construct across these dimensions: in the 
terms used here, the assessment a) of a robust ontology, b) a consistent epistemology, and 
c) consistent alignment between the two.  Suddaby’s framework of construct clarity 
therefore offers an explicit assessment for determining whether, and what type of, 
ontological shift/drift may have occurred. 
 
The results of such an analysis can then be plotted on a genealogy that exposes differences 
between epistemological constructs that may on first inspection appear closely related to one 
another, but which in fact actually rest on very different ontological underpinnings.  The concept 
of genealogy is most associated with Charles Darwin, whose ‘Tree of Life’ sketch from 
‘Notebook B’ of his voyage on the Beagle, dating from 1837-8 and reproduced at Figure 3.  The 
diagram constitutes the earliest and best known approach to explaining the ‘transmutation of 
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species’ in which several differentially related species might evolve over time from a single 
starting point.  The notes read: 
 
Thus between A & B immense gap of relation. C & B the finest gradation, B & D rather greater 
distinction. Thus genera would be formed. — bearing relation to ancient types with several extinct 
forms.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Here we have a basic methodology for assessing the degree of relatedness/difference 
between different organisms of possibly similar appearance.  For example, the genealogical 
differences between various organisms can be set out clearly through use of a taxonomic table.  
In this instance, Table 1 shows clearly that, although superficially similar, sharks and whales 
share only one character state, the vertebral column: 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
In Figure 4 below, Carlson (1999) demonstrates the power of phylogenetic trees in laying 
bare the extent of genealogical difference between apparently similar organisms: in this case, 
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although the whale and the shark appear to be closely related, the closest relationship is actually 
shared between the whale and the human.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
This methodology for exposing genealogies of difference between apparently similar 
organisms is arguably equally useful for exposing differences between apparently similar ideas, 
such as constructs ending with the ‘-of practice’ suffix.  The next section makes use of 
Suddaby’s criteria for construct clarity to assess relative robustness of ontology, consistency of 
epistemology, and degree of epistemic-ontological alignment between the seven related, 
apparently similar ‘-of practice’ constructs, displaying these on a similar taxonomic table – 
Table 2 – that exposes their genealogy of difference. 
 
Exposing Ontological Shift and Drift Within the CoP Canon 
 
Cognition in Practice (Lave, 1988).  CoPs arguably have their origin in Jean Lave’s 
Cognition in Practice (1988), a critique of cognitivist anthropology, psychology and sociology, 
in which she performed a conscious ontological shift of conjunction, arguing that self-contained, 
entitative notions of individual cognition had no real existence outside of “the whole person in 
action, acting within the settings of that activity.  It is within this framework that the idea of 
cognition as stretched across mind, body, activity and setting begins to make sense (1988: 18).  
In response, Cognition in Practice drew on early ‘practice theorists’ such as Giddens (1979) and 
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Bourdieu (1977), outlining a strongly practice-based worldview that corresponds with the 
characteristics appearing at the ‘process’ end of the spectrum in Figure 2.  At the level of 
ontology, the definition of the phenomenon under study is a process, the context within which 
the phenomenon is studied is the ‘whole person in action’, and at the level of epistemology the 
construct has semantic relationships with various theories of practice.  Table 2 therefore shows 
the epistemic-ontological alignment of ‘cognition in practice’ along the process dimension 
(shown as ‘P’ to refer to ‘process’), and that this therefore be considered an example of 
theoretically generative ontological shift – from ‘person’ to ‘whole person in action’. 
 
Community of Practice ‘1’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  Drawing on and extending this 
analysis, Lave and Wenger’s (1991) seminal book Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation described a delicate cognitive dynamic – a process – that they had identified as 
occurring amongst small groups of artisans.  The process describes a virtuous circle where 
novices begin participating on the periphery of group social interaction and, as they do so, begin 
to learn and internalise culturally accepted ways of acting within the group.  Novices’ sustained 
participation and associated learning about how to behave results over time in their increased 
proficiency and performance within the group.  This increased proficiency leads in turn to their 
increased motivation and identification with the group itself.  Simultaneously, with sustained 
proficiency and performance comes increased social legitimacy of novices’ knowledge claims, 
as they move in status from newcomers at the periphery of the group towards greater acceptance 
by, and location within, the core of key members. 
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This construct, which Lave and Wenger termed legitimate peripheral participation (LPP), is 
argued to be a useful way to understand how participation, learning, personal identification, 
performativity, and social status interact with one another within an unfolding social context.  
Although Lave and Wenger’s core idea (and the title of their book) concerned an unfolding 
process, they also coined a term to represent any small group of people engaged in this process: 
community of practice.  A key point here is that ‘community of practice’ is an entity, but it 
makes sense only as a construct in relation to LPP, a particular, carefully defined process.  Table 
2 therefore shows that although the notion of a CoP – an entitative term - has been introduced 
into the construct, the definition of the construct itself remains firmly a process (LPP).  
Similarly, the context remains that of situated activity – an unfolding process – and the semantic 
relationships upon which the construct draws are consistently process- and practice- related.  In 
various ways these all investigate cognition/activity and culture as a mutually constitutive 
dialectic, including those of Bourdieu (1977), Giddens (1979), Engeström (1987), Lave’s 
previous work on practice (1988), Orr (1986) and Wertsch (1985).  Situated learning is 
therefore shown in Table 2 as exhibiting epistemic-ontological alignment and construct 
coherence, and ‘ontological stasis’ in that there has been very little movement from Lave’s 
original process-oriented positioning. 
 
Community of Practice ‘2’ (Wenger, 1998).  Following on from his 1991 work with Jean 
Lave, Etienne Wenger published a book in 1998 that sought to flesh out the CoP construct (here 
termed Community of Practice ‘2’), and apply it explicitly to the organizational setting.  
Wenger’s book Communities of Practice begins by building on the ontological commitment to 
process of his work with Lave, drawing on various process-oriented theories of practice, 
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meaning, situated experience, subjectivity, and identity (1991: 14).  However, the primary focus 
exhibits a shift away from Lave and Wenger’s original dynamic of LPP, a firmly process-
oriented worldview, to the more entitative construct of the CoPs themselves – those groups of 
people who may be said to be exhibiting signs of this dynamic.  Wenger’s book constitutes a 
shift in focus from the anthropological observation and analysis of localised process, 
characteristic of his 1991 work with Lave, to architecture of organization-wide generative 
infrastructure around which it is argued that a similar process may occur.  Rather than 
processes, organizations are now seen as social designs directed at practice (1998: 241). 
 
However, despite the shift of definitional focus onto the CoP construct and shift of context 
to (similarly entitative) organizational “learning architectures” (1998: 237) Wenger continues to 
acknowledge the importance of a process dimension within the construct.  He does this via a 
thoughtful discussion of “the concept of reification”, defined as “the process of giving form to 
our experience by producing objects that congeal this experience into ‘thingness’” (1998: 58). In 
particular, a strong link is maintained between the notion of CoP as reified form, and its 
underlying generative dynamic, LPP, in which entities and processes are mutually constitutive, 
comprising a “duality of participation and reification” (1998: 63).  For this reason, the 
definition, context and semantic relationships are all marked as P/E (where ‘E’ refers to ‘entity’) 
in Table 2, since these all contain an emphasis on both process and entitative dimensions.  In 
this sense, Wenger can be seen to be making a ‘playful’ ontological shift in the form of a slight 
abstraction towards the entitative pole of the spectrum in Figure 2, whilst maintaining 
epistemic-ontological alignment, and construct clarity. 
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Wenger’s ‘playful’ reframing demonstrates the capacity of ontological shift to generate 
thought within the organizational community.  Amongst practitioners, major organizations 
worldwide have launched ‘professional community’ programmes that aim to replicate the 
benefits of LPP to serve a range of purposes; although the existence of LPP within such 
groupings is often not proven, they are often associated with positive benefits (e.g. Lesser & 
Storck 2001; Sole & Edmonsdon 2002; Pan & Leidner 2003; Garrety, Robertson, & Badham 
2004; Dupouet & Yildizoglu 2006).  Within the management research community, the construct 
has generated a rich theoretical debate that includes discussion of critical perspectives (Fox 
2000; Alvesson & Willmott 2002; Kimble & Hildreth 2004) and the potential complexity in the 
relationship between CoPs and canonical organizational structure (Thompson 2005), as well as 
CoPs’ more mainstream potential as, for example, a valuable professional development tool 
(Swan, Scarborough, & Robertson, 2002). 
 
Constellation of practice (Wenger, 1998).  As its name implies, the ‘constellation of 
practice’ that also appears in Wenger’s Communities of Practice is composed of many units of 
communities of practice, a further shift in entitative focus that is only possible following the first 
shift.  As explained by Wenger: 
Some configurations are too far removed from the scope of engagement of participants, too 
broad, too diverse, or too diffuse to be usefully treated as communities of practice (Wenger 1998: 
126-7). 
Although, like the CoP, Wenger’s ‘constellations’ construct invokes the ‘-of practice’ 
suffix, the above definition of constellations of practice shows that these are actually one step 
removed from actual practice as verifiably experienced by anybody. In his discussion of CoPs, 
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Wenger notes that the notion of practice “is a level both of analysis and of experience” (1998: 
126) – i.e. that it ‘exists’ at the level of practice, as well as at the level of analysis.  This 
ontological claim surely cannot be made for ‘configurations’ that are ‘removed from the scope 
of engagement’ (above).  It may be important to question the ontological status of these 
‘configurations’: are they ‘things’ with real existence, or ‘appearances’?  It appears that 
configurations are ‘continuities’ between collections of objects, practices, styles and discourses 
(1998: 129) – the ‘shared reifications’ that different CoPs may have in common.   
 
Although constellations of practice continue to carry the ‘of practice’ badge that appears to 
locate them firmly within a practice-based ontology, closer inspection reveals that they are a 
double abstraction: a reification of a reification.  In this sense the continued use of the ‘-of 
practice’ suffix offers potential for confusion, since it implies that ‘constellations’ are 
performed, when we can see that the construct has actually ‘crept’ two steps away from its 
practice-based root.  Table 2 therefore shows the constellation of practice as an instance of 
ontological drift, in which the fallacy of processification has occurred – i.e. where semantic 
relationships with practice/process theory are invoked at epistemological level to discuss and 
explain a phenomenon that at root definition is actually an entity, being studied in the context of 
its relationships with other entities.  As a result of this epistemic-ontological misalignment, the 
constellation of practice emerges as a markedly less coherent construct than the CoP. 
 
Virtual Community of Practice (Dube et al., 2006).  Dube et al.’s ‘virtual community of 
practice’ (vCoP) is arguably a further example of processification in which an entity is 
described using process terms.  It is therefore another instance of ontological drift.  The authors 
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describe the vCoP as an organizational form “relying primarily on ICT to connect its members” 
(2006: 69-70) that no longer bears any trace of its root concept in Lave and Wenger’s work.  
Although the vCoP continues to locate itself within the ‘-of practice’ genre, the emergent, 
process-oriented ontology of Lave and Wenger’s original concept has been replaced completely 
with an entitative ontology.  Thus we see the creation of a typology of 21 structuring 
characteristics (2006: 69) for the creation of vCoPs, which is possible through “management 
decisions/actions that can be taken to assure the VCoP’s success in view of a particular 
configuration” (2006: 88). 
 
The vCoP framework appears to be a structuring typology leading to generic types, that 
leads in turn to specific configurations of generic types, finally generating management 
decisions and actions contingent upon these specific configurations of generic types.  At the 
level of ontology, it is thus unclear in what sense vCoPs actually exist – i.e. whether vCoPs 
inhere in their status as an organizational form, in their membership, or in the ongoing, dynamic 
activity of their members.  Table 2 therefore identifies the vCoP as a further example of 
ontological drift involving entitative definition and context at the level of ontology, but process-
oriented semantic relationships at the level of epistemology. 
 
Inter-organizational Community of Practice (Moingeon et al., 2006).  An inter-
organizational community of practice (IOCoP) is defined by Moingeon et al. as “an 
organizational form having autonomous governance, gathering voluntary individuals from 
different organizations, with a common professional practice and aiming at developing their 
expertise on an individual basis” (2006: 12).  Moingeon et al. argue that although CoPs 
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operating across organizations have been studied before, “IOCoPs do not represent a mere 
subcategory of CoPs, but a unit of analysis per se” (2006: 3, original italics).  In spite of these 
entitative terms that encourage a view of IOCoPs as things, however, closer examination reveals 
inter-organizational CoPs to be an example of a process being described using entitative 
language: in this sense the opposite of the two previously discussed constructs, constellation of 
practice and vCoP, which were shown as entities being described using process language. 
 
IOCoPs are processes described as entities because Moingeon et al. continue to recognise 
the heritage of CoPs and, by extension, the constitution of IOCoPs in social practice in a manner 
similar to Wenger (1998) – stressing especially the importance of socialisation and 
identification.  Indeed, IOCoPs are in definition and context an expression of non-canonical, 
voluntary interactions around common problematics between people from different 
organizations, a dynamic phenomenon best discussed as a process as shown earlier in relation to 
the CoP.  Table 2 therefore shows IOCoPs as an example of ontological drift in which 
reification has occurred.  This is because a process perspective is taken in the definition and 
context of the phenomenon under study, but this is not aligned with the descriptive language 
used at epistemological level, which appears entitative – with the result that it is again unclear in 
what sense IOCoPs actually exist. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
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Network of Practice (Brown & Duguid, 2000).  In The Social Life of Information (2000), 
Brown and Duguid introduce the construct ‘networks of practice’ to denote groups of people 
where “most of the members are unknown to one another” and where links between members 
are “usually more indirect than direct…members coordinate and communicate through third 
parties or indirectly” (2000: 141-2).  Although networks of practice are perhaps less explicitly 
entitative in emphasis than, for example, constellations of practice, which as shown earlier are 
“removed from the scope of engagement” (Wenger 1998: 126-7), they are markedly more 
entitative in nature than the CoP.  Despite their name, networks of practice are not constituted 
from many CoPs, but directly (for example, the 25,000 reps working for Xerox are said directly 
to constitute a network), and discussed in contrast to more localised CoPs as an alternative 
‘type’ of work-related network.  Brown and Duguid’s concept of a network of practice therefore 
has a very different ontological status from its ‘root’ concept in Situated Learning, and appears 
intended by its creators as a contrasting idea to the CoP, where LPP as identified by Lave and 
Wenger cannot possibly occur, since most members are unknown to one another. 
 
Although a network of practice evolves, it clearly ‘exists’ in a more concrete, more 
entitative sense than the LPP dynamic from which CoPs are constituted, in a way that suggests 
for example that it might be mapped.  In this case, a conscious ontological shift in focal 
definition and context of the phenomenon under study is accompanied by a corresponding shift 
in the semantic relationships claimed for the construct, which are distinguished clearly from 
those of the CoP.  Table 2 therefore shows a clear abstraction towards a more entitative focus in 
which construct coherence and clarity is preserved through the continuing alignment of ontology 
and epistemology. 
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Collectivity of Practice (Lindkvist, 2005).  Finally, Lindkvist’s ‘collectivity of practice’ 
shares the network of practice construct’s concern with distributed knowledge in larger 
organizations, but focuses on the fleeting, more temporary character of many project-based 
associations, where people may work together for a short period of time to complete a task.  
Networks of practice are not communities but goal-oriented associations, in which various 
individuals draw on their own distributed sources of knowledge to contribute ideas and solutions 
to a ‘market’ where they may be adopted or discarded according to rationalist, objective 
assessment criteria.  As noted by Lindkvist, such networks operate in a fundamentally different 
way from Wenger’s CoP, which despite its structural focus nonetheless continues to invoke 
Lave and Wenger’s dynamic of LPP: learning, identification, performance, increased 
recognition, further participation, and so on.   
 
Lindkvist’s paper breaks any lingering links with the practice perspective as outlined by 
Lave and Wenger – and indeed offers a thoughtful explanation of the limitations of this 
perspective for studying project teams in larger, distributed organizations.  In similar manner to 
Brown and Duguid, Lindkvist is explicit about the sense in which the collectivity of practice can 
be said to exist: although it is temporary in nature, it is a definable association rather than an 
emergent dynamic, and locatable in the context of temporary, project-based associations.  The 
shift in semantic relationships that this entails at the level of epistemology is made explicit, with 
a well-explained shift from a focus on knowledge-as-practice to individual knowledge, 
socialization to problem-solving, enculturated workers to free agents, and paradigm-driven 
understanding to the ‘market’ of goal-directed trial-and-error (2005: 1205).  The collectivity of 
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practice is therefore shown in Table 2 as a further example of ontological shift (abstraction) in 
which alignment between ontology and epistemology is successfully maintained, with resulting 
positive implications for construct coherence and clarity. 
 
A Genealogy of Difference 
 
Recalling the genealogy and taxonomy for whale and the shark, the genealogy of difference 
at Figure 5 uses the taxonomy at Table 2 to locate various ‘descendant’ constructs from Lave’s 
Cognition in Practice, both historically and in terms of their degree of apparent relatedness.  
Broadly speaking, the further to the left a construct appears, the more process-oriented it appears 
to be; those constructs on the right are broadly entitative in focus.  The additional examples of 
Lave (1993) and Hadley (2006), are not new constructs that extend the ‘-of practice’ label, but 
are included as examples of related literature that continues within Lave’s process-oriented 
worldview, and therefore where little or no ontological shift or drifts has occurred.  For reasons 
of space these are included merely as referents, rather than subjected to detailed analysis.   
 
Unlike biological genealogies, the intention here is of course not to argue that constructs 
are literally related (for example, that Brown and Duguid (2000)’s network of practice was the 
direct inspiration behind Lindkvist (2005)’s collectivity of practice) but to expose similarities 
and differences, however arrived at, between various apparently closely related constructs as 
these have appeared over time.  Thus, for example, although Lave and Wenger’s (1991) 
Community of Practice (1) and Dube et al. (2006)’s Virtual Community of Practice (underlined 
in both Table 2 and Figure 5) appear superficially related, we can see the extent to which each 
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actually rests on a very different ontological claim and supporting epistemological framework.  
Finally, it is noticeable that examples of ontological shift appear at both left (process) and right 
(entity) sides of the tree in Figure 5, with examples of ontological drift towards the middle of the 
tree – further underlining the argument made in this paper that the effectiveness of a construct 
lies less in the worldview it adopts than the transparency with which it does so. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Four implications for researchers 
 
The preceding discussion and empirical analysis holds several implications for 
organizational theory and practice.  There are four implications for researchers.  The first is that 
conscious, playful shifting of a construct’s relative positioning along the ontological spectrum 
between process and entity can constitute a richly generative methodology for theory generation.  
By the same token, however, the use of a construct in a different, unacknowledged positioning 
along this spectrum carries the risk of an unmooring, or drift, between this new ontological 
position and its supporting epistemological framework, with a negative impact on construct 
clarity. 
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The second implication, which derives closely from the first, is that it is necessary for 
researchers to maintain a constant awareness of the need for epistemic-ontological alignment 
within all of the constructs with which they engage; it is hoped that the framework developed in 
this paper may provide some assistance in this regard. 
 
The third implication is that a systematic awareness of the four types of possible epistemic-
ontological movement as set out in Figure 2 allows the researcher to ask her/himself certain 
questions that will improve the clarity of resulting constructs.  For example, when abstracting a 
concept from the flow of experience (the ‘snapshots’ of the pseudopod in Figure 1, or the 
organogram), are we merely relabeling a process as a noun (reification), or are we describing 
something with a different, more ‘standalone’ ontological status, context, and semantic 
relationships, increased generalisability, and reduced local specificity?  Similarly, when 
reframing an entity as a process (‘person’ becomes ‘person in action’; ‘encoded knowledge’ 
becomes ‘embodied knowledge’, ‘strategy’ becomes ‘strategy as practice’), are we merely 
relabeling a noun as a process (processification), or are we taking into account the conjunctive 
implications of such a shift in terms of acknowledging its emergence over time, its 
connectedness with other entities or concepts, or its limited generalisability across other 
organizations?  As researchers, we can ask these, and other similar questions, about our work 
whether we are consciously attempting an ontological shift, or merely trying to ensure 
avoidance of ontological drift.  Some further useful questions arising from this methodology are 
set out in Table 3. 
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The fourth implication for researchers is that the construct clarity-taxonomy-genealogy 
methodology used here has shown itself to be a useful way of revealing important differences in 
epistemic-ontological alignment between apparently similar-sounding constructs within a single 
genre of organizational literature.  This being the case, it may be that such a methodology might 
be systematically applied to other clusters of related constructs, with equally revealing results.  
As well as offering a potentially useful tool for generating clear, new theory, therefore, the 
framework presented here allows a new way in which to assess critically the landscape of 
existing theory. 
 
Two Implications for Practice 
 
For practitioners seeking to operationalise a construct within the organizational 
environment, there are two linked implications.  First, practitioners should be aware that a 
construct’s epistemic-ontological positioning is likely to offer certain benefits, as well as 
drawbacks, in each case.  Entitative constructs are likely to be more easily implemented, 
controlled and measured, and are thus potentially attractive to managers who may be under 
pressure to deliver predicted outcomes and minimise unexpected consequences.  However, more 
conjoined, process-oriented constructs are likely to promise an engagement with a more socially 
embedded side to organizational life that is likely to hold greater personal relevance and 
motivational power for workers – but prove more difficult to predict and control, which may be 
less attractive to managers.  As discussed earlier, a trade-off is necessarily required between the 
two extremes, and it is important that practitioners understand the likely benefits and 
compromises in each case. 
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For example, we can see immediately that the of CoP/LPP construct (Lave & Wenger 
1991) described earlier as a delicate dynamic achievable in certain localised instances 
(represented in quadrant 2 in Figure 2) may hold some attractiveness to organizations, since it 
holds the promise of creating groups of highly motivated workers capable of sharing knowledge 
very effectively.  However, such groups cannot necessarily be replicated in large organizations 
simply by creating canonical organizational constructs called ‘communities of practice’ 
(quadrant 3 in Figure 2); in such cases, all that will have been created is an entity that appears to 
be a process (processification).  Instead, organizational implementation of the CoP/LPP 
construct is likely to require a more sophisticated approach involving a careful balance between 
local autonomy and management control (Thompson 2005).  The CoP examples demonstrate 
that an appreciation of the epistemic-ontological alignment of a construct will indicate whether 
it is likely to be transferable in a relatively unproblematic way into the organizational context.  
More entitative constructs are likely to be more straightforward for organizations to create and 
support than constructs that are more process-oriented.  As a result, organizations would do well 
to look closely at whether the benefits attributed to a construct are likely to be replicable within 
their own environments.   
 
As a consequence, the second implication for practitioners is the need for an awareness that 
managers who hold organizational accountability may find it difficult to implement and report 
the effectiveness of process constructs in meaningful ways, since they may be required to 
express themselves using primarily entitative terms that promise greater stability and control 
(Chia & Holt, 2008: 142).  As a result, it is possible that more entitative constructs may hold 
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greater natural appeal to organizations – or, where organizations implement process-oriented 
constructs, that managers may feel it more appropriate to discuss and report on these using 
entitative terminology.  Examples of such a possible ‘entitative bias’ discussed in this paper 
include the organizational trend towards adoption of best practices, common standards, and 
professional codes, the ‘harvesting’ of tacit knowledge, and the progressively canonical, 
entitative way in which Lave (1988) and Lave and Wenger’s (1991) initial, process-oriented 
ideas have been expressed and discussed within organizations (Contu & Willmott, 2002; 
Kimble, 2006). 
 
There is broad acceptance amongst both researchers and practitioners of the need to 
achieve greater mutual relevance between the two communities (Abrahamson, 1996; Rynes, 
Bartunek, & Daft 2001), which, if it is shown to exist, an entitative bias of the type outlined 
above can only inhibit.  This is because organizations showing entitative bias may be likely to 
adopt only those research constructs that are entitative in nature, or to harbour simplistic 
expectations about the ease with which these may be implemented – or simply to misunderstand 
more process-oriented research constructs, and reject them altogether.  It would therefore seem a 
worthwhile activity to conduct an empirical investigation of the possible existence of entitative 
bias within the organizational world.  Such an investigation might comprise a systematic 
mapping of the epistemic-ontological alignment of those management constructs that have 
enjoyed particular popularity within the practitioner community, in which the testable 
hypothesis is that organizations display particular susceptibility towards those more abstractable 
constructs that promise greater ownership, and control. 
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Table 3 draws together these implications for into a set of questions intended to enable 
researchers and practitioners to take advantage of an enhanced awareness of ontological shift 
and drift in their own work.  The questions reflect Suddaby’s (2010) framework for construct 
clarity used throughout the paper, and offer a simple test for both audiences to ensure that they 
do not fall foul of the various pitfalls that have been described.  The first column of Table 3 is 
intended for researchers seeking to generate or enhance theory via a ‘playful reframing’ of a 
construct along the lines illustrated here.  The questions encourage the building of a 
genealogical sense of the relative position of a reframed construct in relation to the landscape of 
similar constructs, enabling a more articulate explanation of the purpose and benefits of an 
ontological abstraction/conjunction, as well as a check for contextual appropriateness.  They 
also enable a more knowing attentiveness to epistemological alignment, and overall coherence. 
 
The second column of Table 3 is intended for researchers who may simply seek to re-use 
and apply an existing construct within their own research.  In this case, the questions are 
intended to ensure that the existing definition of the construct is consistent with the context in 
which it is being applied, and that inappropriate properties are not being claimed for the 
phenomenon that do not exist in reality.  Drawing on the earlier discussion of the CoP canon, an 
example might be a discussion of the CoP (Lave & Wenger 1991) in an entitative sense as a 
‘thing’, or the attribution of the socially embedded, emergent properties characteristic of a CoP 
to, say, a project team, or network of practice.  In each case, the researcher would be committing 
an epistemic-ontological fallacy: the former is an example of reification, or describing processes 
as entities, whereas the latter is an example of processification, or describing entities as 
processes. 
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The third column of Table 3 lists several questions for practitioners seeking to 
operationalise concepts from management research within organizations.  The questions 
correspond closely with those suggested for researchers, but are intended to help organizations 
to avoid simplistic treatment of management concepts as ‘magic bullets’ to be transferred 
unproblematically into the organizational context.  Here, there is an emphasis on ensuring that 
there is a close understanding of the ontological status of a management construct, and thus a 
realistic appreciation of the manner and extent to which the construct should be supported – as 
well as of the benefits that may reasonably be expected; benefits are especially unlikely to be 
realised in instances of reification or processification.  Finally, a question specifically 
encourages organizations to consider their motives for selecting a particular construct: in 
particular, whether these may have been clouded by any form of entitative bias, in which a 
construct may be favoured because it appears to offer greater resonance with a discourse of 
ownership and control. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Whether consciously seeking to develop new theory, use existing theory, or apply theory 
within organizations, it is hoped that the concepts of ontological shift and ontological drift, and 
the four types of epistemic-ontological movement that underlie these, may support readers in 
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furthering AMR’s mission in developing new theoretical insights that advance our understanding 
of management and organizations (LePine & King, 2010).  In addition, the concepts outlined 
and illustrated here may assist not only the way in which the management research community 
generates and evaluates good theory, but also the way in which theory is explained to, and 
interpreted, and evaluated by, organizations.  Achieving clarity about the ontological claims we 
make for our constructs – where, and in what sense, these are said to exist – must surely 
constitute a central aim for all those who work within our field. 
 
Finally, it is hoped that addressing a long standing, often fairly polarized debate within 
management studies in a novel way may have helped in the ongoing work to build a more 
inclusive research field capable of engaging with both entitative and process-oriented 
dimensions within a single construct.  Indeed, it should be possible for readers to apply the 
framework presented in Figure 2 together with the evaluative framework in Table 3 to conduct 
and assess their own ‘playful’ ontological reframing.  In undertaking such an exercise, readers 
may in turn highlight areas of epistemological clarity, as well as revealing some of the 
epistemological blindspots, in their own research. 
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TABLE 1: Taxonomy of character states (from Carlson 1999) 
 
                                     
                                       Taxa 
 
Character 
States 
S
h
a
rk
 
T
u
n
a
 
F
ro
g
 
D
im
et
ro
d
o
n
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
W
h
a
le
 
C
ro
co
d
il
e
 
S
a
u
ri
sc
h
ia
n
 
B
ir
d
 
O
m
it
h
sc
h
ia
n
 
1. Vertebral column + + + + + + + + + + 
2. Bony internal skeleton  + + + + + + + + + 
3. 4 limbs; 5 fingers & toes   + + + + + + + + 
4. Lower temporal fenestra    + + + + + + + 
5. Upper temporal fenestra       + + + + 
6. Antiorbital fenestra       + + + + 
7. Amniotic egg    ? + + + ? + ? 
8. Mammary glands    ? + +  ?  ? 
9. Endothermy    ? + +  ? + ? 
10. Reduced 4th & 5th digits        + + + 
11. Fully upright posture        + +  
12. Long S-shaped neck        + +  
13. Long hands         + + 
14. “Bird-hipped” pelvis           
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TABLE 2 
Taxonomy of Epistemic-ontological Alignment and Resulting Construct Clarity 
 
 
Taxa 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions 
of construct 
clarity 
(Suddaby 
2010) 
Cognition in 
practice (Lave 
1988) 
Community of 
Practice (1) 
(Lave & 
Wenger 1991) 
Community of 
practice (2) 
(Wenger 1998) 
Constellation of 
practice (Wenger 
1998) 
Virtual community 
of practice (Dube 
et al 2006) 
Inter-organizational 
community of 
practice (Moingeon 
et al 2006) 
Network of 
practice (Brown 
& Duguid 
2000) 
Collectivity of 
practice 
(Lindkvist 
2005) 
Definition P P P/E E E P E E 
Context P P P/E E E P E E 
Semantic 
relationships 
P P P/E P P E E E 
 
 
Coherence Y 
Ontological 
shift: 
Conjunction 
Y 
Ontological 
stasis 
 
Y 
Ontological 
shift: 
Abstraction 
N 
Ontological 
drift: 
Processification 
N 
Ontological 
drift: 
Processification 
N 
Ontological 
drift: 
Reification 
Y 
Ontological 
shift: 
Abstraction 
Y 
Ontological 
shift: 
Abstraction 
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TABLE 3 
Ensuring Epistemic-ontological Alignment: An Evaluative Framework 
 
Scenario 
Type of question 
Researchers attempting 
ontological shift 
Researchers avoiding ontological 
drift 
Organizations implementing 
management ideas 
Definition Is there an opportunity to generate 
new theoretical perspectives via an 
ontological reframing?  
Where might such a reframed 
construct be located in Figure 2 in 
relation to any existing constructs? 
What are the benefits and limitations 
of such (a further) 
abstraction/conjunction? 
What is the nature of the phenomenon 
under study? 
What claims are being made for it at the 
ontological level?  In what sense can it 
be said to exist? 
Is this definition consistent with 
previous usage of the construct? 
Is the phenomenon a thing that the 
organization can create, own, and 
control?  Is it an entity to be built, or a 
behavioural process to be cultivated? 
What is the extent of its interlinkage 
with/dependency on other phenomena? 
Where can the phenomenon be said to 
exist, e.g. in physical structures, group 
behaviour, or peoples’ heads? 
Context Does the empirical context support 
such an attempt?  Is it practical? 
Is the definition appropriate to the 
empirical context? 
Have the more context-dependent/risky 
aspects of implementing the construct 
been underestimated? 
Semantic 
relationships 
What sort of concepts, supporting 
frameworks and language will be 
required to support the construct at 
epistemological level? 
Will it be necessary to draw upon an 
adjacent literature for these? 
Are the concepts, supporting 
frameworks and language an 
appropriate lens through which to view 
the phenomenon? 
Are entitative terms being used to 
describe processes (reification), or 
process terms used to describe entities 
(processification)? 
Are entitative terms being used to 
describe processes (reification), or 
process terms used to describe entities 
(processification)? 
Is any unconscious entitative bias 
present in the selection of this construct? 
Coherence Is there any lingering, residual inconsistency between the ontological focus, empirical context, and the terms and 
associated theoretical constructs being used to describe/discuss these? 
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FIGURE 1 
The Pseudopod: “Entity is Not Just Entity and Movement is Not Just Movement” (Van 
Foerster 1967, in Bakken & Hernes 2006) 
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FIGURE 2 
Ontological shift or ontological drift?  A typology for maintaining construct clarity 
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1 2 1 4 Ontological drift (Fallacy of processification): ‘attributing process-like qualities to entities’
3 4 3 2 Ontological drift (Fallacy of reification) – ‘attributing entitative existence to processes’
1 2 3 4 Ontological shift (Abstraction): ‘coalescing around representations to give form to experience’
3 4 1 2 Ontological shift (Conjunction): ‘enhancing understanding of representations by exploring their engagement with experience’
Abstraction
Conjunction
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FIGURE 3 
Darwin’s Tree of Life Sketch, taken from Notebook B (1837-8) (University of 
Cambridge Library) 
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FIGURE 4 
Defying Appearances: Are Whales Closer to Sharks, or to Humans? 
Phylogenetic Tree (from Carlson 1999) 
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FIGURE 5 
Defying Appearances: Are the CoP and vCoP related Constructs? 
Genealogical Tree 
 
 
Cognition in
Practice (Lave 
1988)
Community of 
Practice (1)
(Lave & Wenger 
1991)
The practice of
Learning (Lave 
1993)
Constellation of 
practice
(Wenger 1998) 
Community of 
Practice (2)
(Wenger 1998) 
Inter-organizational
Community of Practice 
(Moingeon et al 2006) 
Network of Practice
(Brown & Duguid
2000) 
Collectivity of 
Practice
(Lindkvist 2005)
Virtual Community
of Practice
(Dube et al 2006) 
Participation (Handley
et al 2006)
T
im
e
Process
worldview
Entitative
worldview
 
52 
 
Mark Thompson is a lecturer in information systems at Cambridge University, and director of 
Methods Consulting, a London-based business and IS consulting firm.  He received his Ph.D 
from Cambridge University in 2003.  His current research interests include process-based 
theoretical perspectives on work, identity, and social organization. 
